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Peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Africa: The potential contribution of a UN Emergency Peace Service

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Introduction

Despite a drop in the number of African countries involved in conflict, Africa's history of colonisation and the absence of democratic governance have led the continent down a path of civil wars, genocides and other forms of violence.¹ Of the 58 Chapter VII-mandated United Nations peacekeeping operations since 1990, 32 have been in Africa and mostly in response to civil strife.² Notwithstanding this wealth of experience, UN peace operations in Africa are still struggling to achieve their mandates, especially when the use of force is required to protect civilians and successfully implement a peace agreement.

Two interconnecting features of the contemporary political landscape are relevant to this discussion on peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Africa. First, the end of the Cold War relaxed the bi-polar paralysis in the UN Security Council (UNSC). This

increased the number of peace operations deployed as well as complicated the roles they were expected to play. Second, there was a normative transformation in peacekeeping. This was initiated by the belief in a moral imperative to use force to protect victims and a broadening of the Westphalian definition of threats to international peace and security to include gross human rights violations. This shift culminated in the agreement by leaders at the World Summit of 2005 that states have a primary responsibility to protect their own populations against 'atrocities crimes' and that the international community has a responsibility to act when governments neglect to protect the most vulnerable members of their states.³

The infamous UN failures in Somalia and Rwanda triggered significant reforms and measures to improve peacekeeping performance generally and in Africa specifically. Seminal UN policy reports – from the Brahimi Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000) to the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) and *In Larger Freedom* (2005) – highlight the problems facing the UN peacekeeping system as well as some potential solutions. Despite subsequent reforms, complaints about weak doctrine, unrealistic and unclear mandates, inadequate resources, delays in deployment and poor planning of missions are still common. Other familiar criticisms include the lack of coordination among peacekeepers from different nations once deployed – manifested in diverse rules of engagement, operating procedures and weapons systems – as well the absence of well-trained and adequately equipped peacekeepers.

This article explores whether a United Nations Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS) could have addressed some of the failings of the peacekeeping operations in Rwanda (1993–1994) and Darfur (2006–2008). Both the Rwanda and Darfur civil wars have been accompanied by mass human rights violations perpetrated either directly or indirectly by the respective governments.⁴ In Rwanda, however, a larger proportion of the population was killed and the genocide occurred over a much shorter time period.⁵ In Darfur forced displacement – and the related consequences of disease and malnutrition – has been the primary cause of death rather than direct killing as was the case in Rwanda. However, in both cases the outcome of inadequate peacekeeping resources, political will and mandates was a failure to protect civilians and deter atrocities.

We consider possible entry points at which a UNEPS could have been deployed, if it existed, to supplement the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) and the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and UN Support Packages in Darfur. We examine whether a UNEPS could have overcome some of the political and practical challenges facing these peacekeeping missions. In particular, we explore how it could have helped to alleviate in the short term the suffering of the civilian populations until it was possible to deploy a more robust peacekeeping operation and a viable political solution could be achieved.

A United Nations Emergency Peace Service

The idea of a standing UN military force is not new. The UN's architects proposed an international army at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944, making the idea of a standing military force older than the organisation itself. While article 43 of the UN Charter called for the establishment of military forces at the disposal of the UNSC, representing the first attempt to provide a standby UN rapid reaction force, Article 44 captures the resistance to the idea, giving states the option to contribute forces to UNSC-endorsed operations.⁶

The desire for a standing UN capacity to deal with peace and security issues never disappeared. From 1948 to 1995 over a dozen proposals were made,⁷ ranging from ambitious suggestions for a permanent standing UN army to a more loosely arranged standby system. In his report entitled *An agenda for peace*, former UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Boutros Boutros-Ghali maintained that to ensure the 'credibility of the United Nations as a guarantor of international security ... [the] ready availability of armed forces on call could serve, in itself, as a means of deterring breaches of the peace ...'.⁸ He went on to recommend that the UNSC consider using peace-enforcement units in clearly defined circumstances, and that they be available on a permanent basis and under the command of the Secretary-General.⁹ Around the time that this report was released, the Canadian government conducted a comprehensive study on the feasibility of a rapid reaction capability that favoured incremental reform within the UN Secretariat as opposed to developing a UN standing army. Such an approach was seen to involve fewer risks and obligations and was preferred over the creation of a supranational peacekeeping force because it would give states greater control over international peace and security issues.¹⁰

The closest the UN has come to the 'peace enforcement units' envisaged by Boutros-Ghali are the UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS) and Standby High-Readiness Brigade for UN Operations (SHIRBRIG). Both UNSAS and SHIRBRIG are supported by a UN supply and logistics depot in Brindisi, Italy, which was created in 1994. However, these mechanisms have resulted in similar deployment delays and shortages of personnel and equipment as those faced by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). This is primarily because each participating member state retains the right to decide on a case-by-case basis whether it will provide assistance and troops. Other efforts to develop a reliable capability for rapid action include regional forces and ad hoc mechanisms such as NATO, the Economic Community of West African States in Liberia and Sierra Leone and the European Union battle group. These groups, however, are not able to deploy immediately and do not possess the full range of expertise needed to prevent mass human rights violations.

One of the latest proposals for a UN rapid-reaction arrangement, which is gaining support in various countries, is that of a UN emergency peace service, designed to prevent genocide

and crimes against humanity.¹¹ UNEPS is envisaged as a 'first-in, first-out' service. It would supplement existing UN and regional operations as well as other early warning and preventive capacities at the UN rather than be expected to perform the full spectrum of the UN's conflict management functions. It would be permanent, based at UN designated sites, including mobile field headquarters, and be able to respond immediately to an emergency. UNEPS personnel would be individually recruited from among those who volunteer from many countries so it would not suffer the delays of ad hoc forces, the reluctance of UN members to deploy their own national units or gender, national or religious imbalance. Its personnel would be expertly trained and coherently organised to avoid the challenges of a lack of skills, equipment, cohesiveness and experience in resolving conflicts. UNEPS would be a dedicated service with a wide range of professional skills within a single command structure, prepared to conduct multiple functions in diverse UN operations. This would enable it to avoid divided loyalties, confusion about the chain of command or functional fragmentation. It would provide an integrated service encompassing 15 000 to 18 000 civilian, police, judicial, military and relief professionals, which would enable it to deploy all the components essential for peacekeeping and enforcement operations. UNEPS could be a bridge between preventative services and reactive responses to mass atrocities. Research is being conducted on the cultural and political feasibility of establishing such emergency peace services on a regional basis in Southeast Asia as well as in Africa.¹²

Rwanda

After the signing of the Arusha peace accords by the Rwandan government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front on 4 August 1993, the UN was requested to provide an international force to ensure implementation. From the beginning, the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda was plagued by delays in deployment, an inadequate number of troops and equipment, a weak mandate, and limited political will from UN member states to support the mission. It took two months before the UNSC resolution authorising UNAMIR was passed, and another five months before the force was fully deployed in late March 1994.¹³ Despite the estimate of UNAMIR's reconnaissance mission, led by Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire, that 4 500 troops would be required, only 2 548 military personnel were approved. If the UNAMIR force had been stronger, the Hutu extremists might have been deterred and their ability to move so quickly to expand the killings from Kigali into rural areas might have been restricted. Furthermore, peacekeeping reinforcements were not forthcoming, despite several requests by Belgium in the first few months of 1994 after signs of the impending genocide had begun to emerge. The US and UK were reportedly reluctant to move from a Chapter VI consensual peacekeeping operation to the higher risk confrontational peace enforcement.¹⁴

According to Bruce Jones there was an intelligence gap between the regional process which resulted in the Arusha accords, and the structure of the international force that was

ultimately deployed by the UN.¹⁵ Jones argues that the outcome of the Arusha process was deeply flawed because of the reliance upon false assumptions about the willingness of the parties to implement the power-sharing agreement.¹⁶ As a result, UNAMIR came to Rwanda as a neutral intervention force expecting a relatively straightforward mission to implement a peace agreement that would lead to a transitional government. The failures in peacemaking and peacekeeping resulted in a lack of preparedness for the challenges of peace enforcement. Because of its lack of intelligence about the underlying political dynamics, the UN had no contingency plans for responding to an escalation of violence, far less to the scale of the genocide that ensued.

A UNEPS with strong regional connections might have been able to overcome the inadequacies of the UN force that was sent to implement the Arusha peace accords. First, such a UNEPS might have been able to bridge the intelligence gap and have been better informed about the regional peacemaking process and the potential for a Hutu extremist 'spoilers' backlash.¹⁷ Second, a better prepared and stronger mission might have been able to deploy more quickly and ensure that the losers would cooperate with the implementation of Arusha. Finally, the availability of a UNEPS might have been able to overcome the reluctance of the UNSC to authorise a Chapter VII peace enforcement mandate based on a more realistic assessment of the existing threats and because they would assume responsibility for military risks.

The major problem in the lead up to the genocide was the lack of political will of member countries to provide UNAMIR with adequate equipment, trained forces and firepower. The consensus seems to be that, at that stage, while a Chapter VII mandate would have been the ideal, the genocide could have been averted even without it.

In response to the escalating violence during April and increasingly compelling evidence of genocide, the UNSC reduced UNAMIR after ten Belgian peacekeepers were killed and threatened to completely withdraw the mission. However, Dallaire refused to leave and stayed in Rwanda with a severely reduced force of 450 minimally armed and poorly supplied troops.¹⁸ Dallaire's forces were only mandated to use force in self-defence, not for the protection of Rwandans. And yet, despite its limited mandate, UNAMIR still managed to save 32 000 Rwandan lives.

Why were the troops withdrawn rather than being increased and given a Chapter VII mandate to protect Rwandans? Michael Barnett argues that an 'ethic of indifference' was created by the UN's preoccupation with its own survival which influenced the organisation to avoid another peacekeeping failure.¹⁹ This could help to explain the overoptimistic view of the situation in Rwanda as UNAMIR was being established. According to former UNSC President Colin Keating, the council was preoccupied with crises elsewhere, including those in Bosnia, Somalia, North Korea and Haiti. He also points out that information flow from the Secretariat was inadequate and the force

structure ‘bore no relationship to what was really needed’.²⁰ Keating reports that, in the absence of information from the Secretariat after the genocide had begun, he obtained personal briefings from humanitarian organisations which he passed on to the UNSC, but by this time a number of troop-contributing countries were already threatening to withdraw because of the growing risk to their troops. The problem was not so much a lack of troops but rather a lack of political will to provide the necessary logistical support, which he argues was also potentially available.²¹ Testament to this is the impressive logistics of the evacuations of nationals and subsequent response to the humanitarian crisis in Goma refugee camps.²² Filip Reyntjens goes further and claims that the evacuation troops could have restored order in Kigali and averted the genocide.²³

While no-one can know for certain that the genocide could have been prevented, Dallaire and others have argued that the scale and duration of the genocide would at least have been reduced if elite troops had been available to the UN during the genocide. The Independent Inquiry into UN actions during the Rwandan genocide concluded that even the existing UNAMIR force of 2 500 (if fully deployed and equipped) would still have been able to stop or at least minimise the massacres in Rwanda.²⁴ According to Dallaire, a Chapter VII-mandated intervention force of 5 000 troops could have prevented the genocide, even if deployed 24 hours after it began on 7 April 1994. The force could have assisted with the return of refugees and displaced persons, as well as the cessation of hostilities and ensuring the successful delivery of humanitarian aid.²⁵ Building on Dallaire’s proposal, the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict offered an alternative strategy for ending the genocide, and recommended the creation of a standing peacekeeping capacity to facilitate such interventions in the future.²⁶

On the other hand, Kuperman argues that the Dallaire/Carnegie plan of a 24-hour deployment of 5 000 troops in Kigali would not have been sufficient to stop the massacres already spreading rapidly throughout Rwanda. According to Kuperman the majority of Tutsi would have been killed before the required mandate could have been obtained and the troops and logistical support promised and deployed. He also argues such a plan would have sustained unacceptable levels of casualties or even failure.²⁷ Such a deployment could have provided hope, he concedes, but not guaranteed success, which begs the question of whether saving some lives is better than saving none.

The challenges facing UNAMIR could arguably have been overcome in the early stages of the genocide by a standing force such as UNEPS. A UNEPS could have addressed one of the crucial factors identified by the Carnegie Commission report – an available force that was well-trained and equipped to ‘overcome a dangerous yet ambiguous and unpredictable threat’²⁸ without the additional need of political will from nation states. A UNEPS could have moved quickly to reinforce UNAMIR either in January or February 1994 in response to Dallaire’s cable and other evidence of instability; in early April as soon as the killings began; or later in April once there was incontrovertible evidence of

genocide. By the time the UNSC was convinced of the need to act in early May, the existence of a UNEPS might also have been beneficial as it could have facilitated a quick deployment. Instead, because of the US threat to veto and debates over military strategy, the UNSC resolution was further delayed and UNAMIR II was never deployed.²⁹ As Kuperman argued, deployment of additional forces in late April or early May would have been too late to prevent the majority of the killings. However, it could still have saved lives and ended the genocide sooner. It would have been more effective than the French Operation Turquoise which was not authorised until late June and was accused of doing more to protect the fleeing *génocidaires* than those being targeted for extermination.³⁰

The Independent Inquiry report made several recommendations resulting from the Rwanda experience which have subsequently been implemented, including the increased focus on protection of civilians in UN peacekeeping mandates.³¹ The report also recommended an improvement in UN capacity for peacekeeping and rapid deployment, and a number of UNSC members specifically supported the call for a rapid reaction capacity. The French and American representatives focused on the need to expand the lessons learned from Rwanda to the whole of the Great Lakes region, with a particular emphasis on responding adequately to the crises in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), including implementation of the Lusaka Peace Agreement. Yet as we will now argue, the international community is still struggling to apply these lessons to the violence in Darfur.

Darfur

The Darfur conflict hit the agendas of the UNSC and the African Union's Peace and Security Council in 2004. Since then, we have seen the deployment of AMIS (2004–2007) and the authorisation of a 20 000-strong, Chapter VII-mandated AU-UN Hybrid Mission (UNAMID) (2007) that is still struggling to become fully operational. Two other UN interventions were mounted in an attempt to support AMIS and its metamorphosis into UNAMID, namely the Light and Heavy Support Packages (2006–2007).³² Sandwiched in-between was UNSC Resolution 1706, authorising the expansion of the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS)³³ into Darfur under a Chapter VII mandate. This resolution made deployment conditional on the consent of the Government of Sudan (GoS), who failed to provide it.³⁴ These many resolutions and operations have not resulted in a credible deterrence or reduction in attacks on civilians and humanitarian workers in Darfur.

Could the existence of a standing UN rapid reaction force have been an effective tool to help the international community respond to the violence in Darfur? We examine some of the operational and political obstacles that AMIS and the UN support packages faced in their efforts to protect civilians, and consider whether a UNEPS could have overcome them. Our analysis refers to the time when the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland, after returning from his fourth mission to the region, said that 'the situation in

West Darfur, and in Darfur at large, [is] closer to the abyss than I have witnessed since my first visit in 2004'.³⁵ Because of the GoS's intransigence there was no political opening for any intervention, including a UNEPS, prior to the agreement to deploy AMIS.³⁶

Despite the ongoing atrocities which might have morally justified an armed intervention, a UN peace enforcement mission against the expressed wishes of the Sudanese government was, and still is, politically unachievable. Kofi Annan made this clear in 2006 when he said: 'The fact is, without the consent of the Sudanese government, we are not going to be able to put in the troops. So what we need is to convince the Sudanese government to bend and change its attitude and allow us to go in.'³⁷ Indeed, the International Crisis Group argues that coercive military intervention in Darfur for civilian protection purposes would be unjustified because it is unclear whether such action would do more good than harm.³⁸ Furthermore, a coercive intervention force would require tens of thousands of robust troops (probably much more) to fight its way into Darfur and protect itself against opposing Sudanese forces.³⁹

AMIS' ineffectiveness was largely due to a combination of practical and political challenges. Practically, there was an absence of adequate equipment and materiel – including helicopters, ground support and intelligence apparatus – and financial resources in the AU to deploy a robust peacekeeping operation.⁴⁰ Those with the resources (the EU and US) did not provide enough support to sustain such a mission. Politically, the GoS, its militia, and allies in the UNSC have been obstructing attempts by the international community and the AU to end hostilities. But ultimately, there was an absence of political will – internationally, regionally and bilaterally – to support unified and sustained pressure on Sudan to end its campaign of atrocities in Darfur.

By October 2006 AMIS comprised over 7 000 uniformed personnel (6 143 military personnel and 1 360 police), although the authorised strength was 10 000 military personnel and 1 500 police.⁴¹ Despite some EU support, AMIS lacked the resources to adequately protect civilians and humanitarian workers.⁴² AMIS was thus largely an observer mission, not authorised to disarm the militias or penalise the government or rebels for the ceasefire violations.⁴³

The EU and US were prepared to provide funding and limited logistical support but no troops. In fact, even funding began to wane as the main financial backers sought to shift financial responsibility to the broader international community.⁴⁴ The SHIRBRIG members, despite being the most advanced mechanism for UN peace operations to date, lacked the combined commitment to mount a deployment at brigade strength (5 000 troops) and many governments were unwilling to participate without this assurance.⁴⁵

The urgency of the situation and need for action was ever present and clear. In a November 2006 communiqué, Kofi Annan recommended a peacekeeping force of 17 000

with 3 000 police. At the same time he warned the UNSC that it may take months for these forces to be deployed even though the 'Darfurians can not wait another day'.⁴⁶ This critical situation still had not been addressed eight months later when the rapid deployment of troops and supplies to support AMIS was requested by the UNSG in his letter to the President of the Security Council 'as an immediate priority ... through the generation and deployment of the heavy support package'.⁴⁷ However, the personnel and equipment promised in the UN Light and Heavy Support Packages suffered from deployment delays which were exacerbated by an inhospitable Sudanese government. According to the report of the UNSG on UNAMID, 'At the transfer of authority UNAMID will have at its disposal essentially the same assets which are currently on the ground for AMIS. Consequently, in its early phase, UNAMID will still have limited capacity to bring about the desired early effect on the ground, and on the lives of the population of Darfur'.⁴⁸

If a dedicated UNEPS existed that was specifically designed to protect civilians and ensure rapid deployment to complex emergencies, it might have been able to support AMIS in the transition towards mounting UNAMID, an operation that would have been logistically and financially sustainable and capable of contributing meaningfully to the restoration of security and the protection of civilians in Darfur.

First, a readily deployable standing capacity could have eliminated the time gap between the authorisation of UN support packages and their full deployment. A UNEPS could have responded rapidly to the UNSC call on 19 December 2006 for the immediate deployment of a UN support package to buttress AMIS. One of the key obstacles to the swift deployment of the UN support packages was the lack of security in the face of inadequate infrastructure in Darfur and the AMIS camps. If there had been a UNEPS with deployable military elements which could have been assigned to accommodate the deployment of additional battalions, it might have been possible to overcome some of these obstacles.⁴⁹ Such a UNEPS would have needed to be self-sufficient and combat ready and have sufficient air support and medical and mechanised units to allow it to be highly mobile and fully capable of establishing in hostile areas, repelling attacks and protecting convoys and establishments.

Second, such a service could potentially have addressed the problem of insufficient political will among governments to support the operation. It would have achieved this by providing a secure environment and the reassurance that risk to personnel, enabling units and equipment would be limited. UNEPS would possibly have been able to help fill the AMIS gaps in frontline reinforcement through the provision of well-trained and fully equipped, combat-ready troops, aircraft, communications equipment and combat and engineering vehicles. It could also have provided the deployable military elements assigned to each mission, such as helicopter squadrons and engineering units. The security and support provided by a UNEPS could have assisted with the deployment

of the HSP 2 250 military personnel in the areas of transport, engineering, signals and logistics, surveillance, aviation and medical services by ensuring that they were adequately protected.

Third, since UNEPS personnel would have had an international composition, made up of a balanced variety of countries, cultures and religions, its presence could have helped to avert regional accusations of neo-colonialism and the political quagmire of sending American (or Western) troops into a Muslim country after the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions. UNEPS personnel would have been trained in gender and human rights sensitivities and thus could have been able to address the needs of internally displaced persons and issues such as sexual and gender-based violence which are still significant problems in Darfur.⁵⁰

Although a UNEPS could have helped overall to address the practical challenges of AMIS and the UN support packages, the political challenges would have remained. The GoS has continually obstructed the AU, imposing uncalled for curfews and bureaucratic obstacles. Most significantly, it has denied the AU a reliable supply of fuel, especially for AU aircraft.⁵¹ The Light and Heavy Support Packages were both delayed by stalling tactics on the part of the Sudanese government. These aspects suggest that a UNEPS would have been subjected to the same interferences as were AMIS and the UN support packages.

The existence of a UNEPS could, however, have motivated the international community to apply more pressure on Khartoum to agree to meaningful intervention by addressing the problem of insufficient political will among governments to support AMIS and kickstart UNAMID via the UN support packages. By addressing the political risks associated with casualties in peacekeeping, a UNEPS could have sidestepped the cost-benefit calculations made by states – a key factor that prevented meaningful intervention in Darfur. The problem that remains is the support the GoS receives from China, Russia and Arab states which have economic and political interests in opposing intervention. However, if the rest of the international community were less wary of the costs associated with peacekeeping operations, they might also be motivated to influence these countries to withhold their protection of the regime in Khartoum.

Conclusion

While a UNEPS would not provide the full spectrum of UN conflict responses, it could help to overcome some recurring practical and political obstacles that prevent governments from mounting operations capable of halting mass violence. From a practical perspective, a UNEPS could provide sufficient numbers of highly trained and well-equipped troops at short notice to supplement existing peacekeeping operations or offer a 'first-in, first-out' service. Politically, a UNEPS could respond to the domestic

political backlash associated with ‘body bags’ when governments expose their nationals to security threats in countries which have little perceived economic, political or strategic significance.

In Rwanda and Darfur the peacekeeping missions lacked sufficient well-trained troops, equipment and mandates to provide adequate protection to civilians and stop the violence. In Rwanda there was inadequate intelligence on the dynamics of the peace process as well as the impending genocide which arguably prevented the construction of a suitable operation to match the political landscape. In Darfur the UNSC was clearly aware of the atrocities but failed to act. Each situation appears to confirm Gregory Stanton’s allegation (as paraphrased by Eyal Mayroz) that as far as some key Western governments are concerned, there are two types of humanitarian ethics – and the second one is for Africans.⁵²

We have argued that a UNEPS might have been able to protect Rwandans, especially if it had been deployed during the initial stages of UNAMIR’s presence and immediately after the killings commenced in Kigali.⁵³ A UNEPS with strong regional connections could have filled the intelligence gap that led first to a flawed peace agreement and second to the UN’s failure to prevent the genocide. In Darfur we argued that a self-sufficient and combat-ready UNEPS with adequate deployable military elements might have been able to provide reassurance to governments contributing to the UN support packages that their equipment and personnel would be protected. A more representative and gender sensitive service stemming from a UNEPS could have given the mission greater legitimacy in the eyes of the people of Darfur as well as the GoS. A UNEPS that could act to support regional peacekeeping efforts could also have appeased the Sudanese government’s demand for ‘African solutions to African problems’.

In the final instance both cases reveal that unless the political and conflict resolution resources of the international system are strengthened and become more readily accessible, multilateral security will never be able to reach its full potential.

Notes

- 1 R I Rotberg (ed), *Peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Africa: methods of conflict prevention*, Cambridge, Mass and Washington, DC: The World Peace Foundation and the Brookings Institution Press, 2000.
- 2 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Multilateral peace missions overview, 2009, http://conflict.sipri.org/SIPRI_Internet/index.php4 (accessed 8 January 2009).
- 3 This commitment was strengthened when the UNSC unanimously endorsed Resolution 1674 in 2006, which reaffirmed the responsibility to protect doctrine (see *The responsibility to protect: report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*, Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001).
- 4 The violence in Darfur is not a clear-cut case of intentional annihilation of an ethnic group, and hence some observers feel that a ‘genocide’ label should not be used – see for example S Straus, Rwanda and Darfur: a comparative analysis, *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 1(1) (2006), 41–56, 51.

- 5 Straus, Rwanda and Darfur, 43–44.
- 6 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, New York: United Nations, 1945.
- 7 P A McCarthy, Building a reliable rapid-reaction capability for the United Nations, *International Peacekeeping* 7(2) (2000), 139–154.
- 8 B Boutros-Ghali, *An agenda for peace*, New York: United Nations, 1992, paragraph 43.
- 9 Ibid, paragraphs 43–44.
- 10 Government of Canada, *Towards a rapid reaction capability for the United Nations*, Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1995.
- 11 The UNEPS proposal is being developed in consultation with the DPKO and alongside efforts to advance other UN peacekeeping and security sector reforms, including the Stimson Center's proposal for a standing UN rule of law and police capacity. R C Johansen (ed), *A United Nations emergency peace service: to prevent genocide and crimes against humanity*, New York: World Federalist Movement, Institute for Global Policy, 2006.
- 12 Much work has been done on developing an African Standby Force, such as on-call 'brigades' comprising military units plus civilian and police experts in each of the five main regions of the continent, supported by a common doctrine and logistic backup. There are concerns, however, about its political and practical feasibility.
- 13 UNAMIR was mandated to secure Kigali, monitor the ceasefire, expand the demilitarised zone, demobilise forces, assist with mine clearance, provide humanitarian assistance and monitor security during the period leading up to democratic elections (UNSC Resolution 872, 5 October 1993).
- 14 S R Feil, *Preventing genocide: how the early use of force might have succeeded in Rwanda*, A report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1998.
- 15 B Jones, The Arusha peace process, in H Adelman and A Suhrke (eds), *The path of a genocide: the Rwanda crisis from Uganda to Zaïre*, New Brunswick/London: Transaction Publishers, 1999.
- 16 Key Hutu extremist elements in the Habyarimana regime, the incumbent government at the time of the genocide, felt they were being marginalised and would lose power as a result of the Arusha accords – see Jones, The Arusha peace process, 140.
- 17 We are not suggesting here that the development of a UNEPS with strong regional connections would obviate the need for the UN to develop its own system of early warning to ensure its better preparedness to counter genocide or other mass violence.
- 18 While UNAMIR was officially reduced to 270 personnel, the number deployed never actually fell below 450 – see Feil, *Preventing genocide*, 51.
- 19 M N Barnett, *Eyewitness to a genocide: the United Nations and Rwanda*, Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 2002, 177.
- 20 In An insider's account, in D Malone (ed), *The UN Security Council: from the Cold War to the 21st century*, Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner, 2004, 510, C Keating attributes this to the Secretary-General's reluctance to share information fully with the UNSC (especially Dallaire's January cable to New York) and Rwanda's place on the UNSC which would have meant it was privy to all the information and discussions taking place there.
- 21 Ibid, 510.
- 22 Within days of the commencement of the genocide, 500 French paratroopers were working out of Kigali airport to evacuate French nationals and 1 000 Belgian paratroopers were assembled in Nairobi. At one stage R Dallaire (in *Shake hands with the devil: the failure of humanity in Rwanda*, London: Arrow Books, 2003, 284) discovered that 250 US marines were on their way to Kigali to support UNAMIR and protect US nationals, but they were diverted to Bujumbura in Burundi.
- 23 As cited in A J Kuperman *The limits of humanitarian intervention: genocide in Rwanda*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001, 92. Kuperman argues, however, that the likelihood that these forces could have made a significant difference was minimal because the Belgians and French were supporting opposite sides in the conflict, while the Americans would not risk another Somalia and the domestic political backlash associated with 'body bags'.
- 24 UN Security Council, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, S/1999/1257, UN, 16 December 1999.

- 25 Feil, *Preventing genocide*, 8.
- 26 Ibid.
- 27 Kuperman (ibid, 87) quotes Dallaire as telling BBC reporters in February, six weeks before the genocide commenced, that he would have needed 40 000 troops to guarantee safety in Rwanda.
- 28 Feil, *Preventing genocide*, 17
- 29 Keating, *An insider's account*, 509. The US President signed Policy Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) on 3 May 1994 which restricted US engagement in foreign wars following the debacle in Somalia. The French, of course, did offer to send troops eventually with the belated Operation Turquoise authorised by the UNSC under Chapter VII on 22 June 1994. But given the well-known bias of the French in support of the Rwandan government, elements of which were committing the genocide, the impartiality of French elite troops sent in earlier would have been in question, as indeed it was in relation to Operation Turquoise (see J Mayall, *Humanitarian intervention and international society: lessons from Africa*, in Jennifer M Welsh (ed), *Humanitarian intervention and international relations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
- 30 Mayall, *Humanitarian intervention and international society*, 120–141.
- 31 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.
- 32 From June 2005 to 31 December 2007, NATO also provided assistance to AMIS. Together with the EU, it was involved in the coordination of AMIS personnel airlift as well as the provision of training to AMIS personnel.
- 33 UNMIS was authorised on 24 March 2005 under Chapter VI following the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement between North and South Sudan.
- 34 The UNSC adopted Resolution 1706, which called for the strengthening of UNMIS by up to 17 300 military personnel and up to 3 300 civilian police and 16 Formed Police Units, on 31 August 2006.
- 35 UN News Centre, Annan awaits Sudan letter on hybrid UN force for Darfur; UN aid chief warns of 'abyss', 22 November 2006, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=20706&Cr=sudan&Cr1=> (accessed 8 January 2009).
- 36 It is debatable whether a UNEPS could make a difference if deployed to Darfur today; however, this is beyond the scope of this article.
- 37 Annan, UNSC Press Conference New York, 2006, <http://www.un.org/apps/sg/offthecuff.asp?nid=940> (accessed 16 January 2009).
- 38 International Crisis Group, Getting the UN into Darfur, *Africa Briefing* 43, International Crisis Group, 12 October 2006. This would violate the intervention criterion of proportionality. Furthermore, Eyal Mayroz (Ever again? The United States, genocide suppression, and the crisis in Darfur, *Journal of Genocide Research* 10(3) (2008), 362, 364) argues that every non-military option for addressing the situation in Darfur had not been explored. Last resort is another criterion for coercive military intervention – see International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The responsibility to protect*.
- 39 N Grono, Briefing – Darfur: The international community's failure to protect, *African Affairs* 105(421) (2006), 621.
- 40 International Crisis Group, The AU's Mission in Darfur: bridging the gaps, *Africa Briefing* 28, International Crisis Group, 6 July 2005.
- 41 United Nations Security Council, Report 2007, Darfur/Sudan, June 2007, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.2776081/k.599B/June_2007BRDarfurSudan.htm (accessed 18 January 2009).
- 42 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Deepening crisis in Darfur two months after the Darfur Peace Agreement: an assessment*, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in cooperation with the United Nations Mission in the Sudan, 2006, par 49; Human Rights Watch, *Darfur 2007: chaos by design*, September 2007. Furthermore, according to Africa specialist John Prendergast: 'Very few countries in Africa have excess forces that they are willing to put into a [UN Charter] Chapter 7 environment with a Chapter 6 mandate ... [If these nations] had resources and support, thousands more could be cobbled together' (quoted in E Reeves, UN Support Package: Sudan buys time and diplomatic advantage, *Sudan Tribune*, 2007, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?page=imprimable&id_article=21451 (accessed 8 January 2009)).
- 43 International Crisis Group 2006. Getting the UN into Darfur, 10.

44 Ibid, 3.

45 H P Langille, Preventing genocide: time for a UN 911, 2004, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/reform/2004/1019timefor.htm> (accessed 9 January 2009).

46 United Nations News Centre, Annan awaits Sudan letter on hybrid UN force of Darfur.

47 United Nations Secretary General, Report of the Secretary General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the hybrid operation in Darfur, United Nations, 5 June 2007, paragraph 128.

48 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur S/2007/759, United Nations, 24 December 2007, paragraph 46.

49 One of the recommendations was that the UN should take the lead in assisting in the expansion of AMIS camps to accommodate the deployment of two additional battalions, the three new sector headquarters, and elements of the HSP (see Mayall, Humanitarian Intervention and international society). Based on the assessment of Peter Langille (*Bridging the commitment–capacity gap: a review of existing arrangements and options for enhancing UN rapid deployment*, New York: Center for UN Reform Education, 2002, 94) of the general requirements of a UNEPS, a deployable cell, tailored to the demands of Darfur, could have overseen mission requirements with a view to ensuring self-contained, smaller logistics elements for the duration of the mission.

50 Human Rights Watch, *Darfur 2007: chaos by design*.

51 Reeves, UN support package: Sudan buys time and diplomatic advantage.

52 Mayroz, Ever again? The United States, genocide suppression, and the crisis in Darfur, 380.

53 Once the genocide had spread to rural areas, where 95 per cent of Rwandans lived, the logistical challenges of intervening to stop the genocide might have required a much greater show of military force and resulted in a morally and politically unacceptable loss of life.