

Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*
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Lecture IX: §§138 - 155

We now launch into the swath of text concerned with understanding and other “higher-level” mental notions (intending, thinking, believing, as opposed to “lower-level notions like sensations). Wittgenstein is cashing in his promissory note of §81. In these sections Wittgenstein is attacking the accuracy of treating understanding (of a word or sentence, for instance) as a definite mental process or state. It is difficult to get at what this means. It can be a perfectly anodyne thing to say: Of course understanding is a state, that is, when you understand (e.g., a particular word) you are in the state of understanding that word. When you come to understand a new word, you have been through the process of coming to understand that word. But as always, Wittgenstein wants to voice the suspicion that trivial-looking dicta can change when put to work, or applied in a philosophical way.

These sections are hard to tell a crisp, coherent story about. This may be due to the elusiveness of what Wittgenstein is trying to undercut — what this philosophical misconstrual really amounts to. Yet to me it is clear that he is onto *something* involved in philosophical ways of talking about the mind, some peculiar thing we naturally fall into doing in our talk of mental phenomena.

§154: "Try not to think of understanding as a 'mental process' at all."

Note under §151: "'Understanding a word': a state. But a *mental* state?"

§146: Against the idea that "the understanding itself is a state which is the source of the correct use."

§149: "If one says that knowing the ABC is a state of the mind, one is thinking of a state of a mental apparatus (perhaps of the brain) by means of which we explain the *manifestations* of that knowledge."

§305: "What we deny is that the picture of the inner process gives us the correct idea of the use of the word 'to remember'."

The notion of understanding as the state of a mental apparatus is closely connected with the notions of fixity of meaning and of full content. If you have the idea of a particular, localizable state of understanding, then it would be quite natural to think of full content as given in the content of that state.

Wittgenstein starts by wondering about the curious worry: "We can understand the word in a flash. But how can what we do in a flash be connected with the use, which is extended in time?"

(In *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* I §123 Wittgenstein seems to raise the same problem only summarily to dismiss it, saying that it is a misuse of language.)

That is a dramatic way of raising the problem. A less dramatic way is this: "That I understand a word is something about me — about my mind, perhaps. This something is such that, when it holds, I go on to use the word correctly. My subsequent uses of the word can serve as tests of whether I understand the word. They can make you judge that I did or did not understand the word." — So the uses are certainly connected with the question whether I understand the word. But the use cannot be something "in my mind" — that seems not even to make sense. Actual cases of use are not in the mind. So it is natural to depict what goes on within the model of a state or process; correct uses are *evidence* for that state or process, but are extrinsic to it.

Wittgenstein wants to block that, or at least certain ways of thinking about it. He wants to show that (a) it is a genuine *move* ; (b) that it is not *necessitated* by the facts; and (c) that it is *inaccurate* : some kind of incoherence is involved.

He starts by asking what sort of model we have of such a state and the evidence for it. His explicit example is that of mental pictures. E.g. I understand the word 'cube' when an appropriate picture appears before me. To say that I understand is to say that the correct image is summoned before my mind's eye. — Now this is, of course, a pretty primitive model. Notice, of this view, that Wittgenstein does not say at this point, "Just check. *Do you get such mental pictures when you understand?*" That is (textual) evidence that he is using this, not as a specific target, not as a specific mentalist view of understanding, but as a stalking horse to get at what is at stake in any one of a number of views. What is at stake is the obscurity of the notion of "flowing" or "issuing in." How does the model employ the notion of "issuing in?" Wittgenstein wants to examine that notion.

But why is it appropriate to take this primitive mentalist view as a stalking horse?

We might say that it is the strongest model that we have — that it is a case in which we have the least trouble with the notion of "issuing in." It would be hardest to attack on the grounds that we lack a clear conception of "issuing in."

It should also be noted how Wittgenstein proceeds with this in §139 (see §139c). "Can't it be a picture?" — So he is taking the best case. He goes on to apply a typical strategy of his. To paraphrase: "Look, if *this* would work, if *this* would be the understanding, then having an *actual* picture should fulfill the same function." Maybe it is a picture. Then we can ask, "How does that picture fit the use we make of it?" The picture alone, Wittgenstein points out, does not legislate its application. It is not only the question of the picture here; I actually go on to use it to describe things that look like *that*, not things that look like *this*. It is not just the picture, but the *projection* of the picture onto the real world. Wittgenstein wants to point out the role of projection, and to point out the possibility of other ways of projecting as well. It could be applied in different ways. Once we notice that, then it will seem to us that the picture itself does not fix the application of the word (to get back to the primitive picture). In that sense, it does not fix what we understand when we understand the word. The same mental picture is compatible with different projections and hence different uses of the word. This is the same point that Wittgenstein made about samples in §73. There is nothing intrinsic to the item that legislates its application.

One might suggest that, as far as understanding goes, it must include the projection. Suppose then that the projection is included in the understanding. The question then arises: How does all that stuff get applied to the outside world? Making the projection part of the picture still will not settle any questions about the relation of all that stuff (which is supposed to be "the" state of understanding) to the applications of the word.

The Interlocutor responds in §141 by pointing out that we *do* talk of the application of the picture coming before the mind. If we do talk this way, then how can we be so quick to dismiss the idea that the application is part of the picture in the mind? Wittgenstein goes on to ask when the form of words 'the application of the picture' gets its force — in what sorts of circumstances we talk of the application coming before the mind, with the usual message that what gives the phrase its force are the *particular features* of the application of the picture's coming before the mind. (This is an analogue of Wittgenstein's point about what it is to use one sentence in contrast

with another.). Likewise, 'the application of a picture's coming before the mind' will only have some specific force in the sorts of circumstances Wittgenstein alludes to. If we try to make it into a general phenomenon, it amounts to no more than 'using the word correctly'.

What is the argument about the possibility of different projections supposed to unearth? Wittgenstein, in §140, has a puzzled attitude toward this. We started with the supposition that having the picture of the cube is enough; but what kind of thought is that? Wittgenstein does not want to represent the matter as though we had some kind of mistaken *belief*. He wants to say that we don't actually believe that something like a picture actually forced an application on us. For he is not sure that there *is* something there to believe, that it is at all coherent. We may want to express our belief in that way. But once it is put before us, we see that it will not do. We lack a conception of what we believe. At best we may have what he calls "psychological compulsion" — whereas what we want is "logical compulsion." We do not know what it is for a picture to force (in the logical sense) an application. There is no such notion. It is not that we have mistaken this case for another — not that there is a phenomenon going on elsewhere that we illicitly transfer here. This leads to a kind of puzzlement: if we were not making those kinds of mistake, then what *were* we doing?

We might say that we were taking something for granted, or misapplying an analogy. But there is something right in Wittgenstein's remark that no simple mistake has been made. The fit, or lack of fit, between picture and application, has a content because there are practices in place of using pictures, upon which we rely. The application of mental or actual picture gains significance against the background of our actual operations with pictures. Our practices with pictures are what make a picture into a picture of a particular thing. In that case, then, if this was our model of understanding, then it is only our practices with pictures that make *this* into understanding. That is not the idea with which we started; for the hidden state was to give the whole story. We might say that our primitive model was supposed to be the *whole* story; but when we reflect on how pictures actually operate, we see that it cannot be the whole story.

In thinking about understanding, Wittgenstein thinks, we tend to overlook what else is needed — the background needed to make the occurrence of a picture as decisive of

understanding. We want to make the internal thing into an explanation, yet exclude everything else as irrelevant to the explanation; but it is the "everything else" that makes the internal thing decisive of understanding.

Wittgenstein is trying to get us, in §§138-142, to see that the model of "the thing I know, or have, that determines all of my subsequent uses," is something for which we *lack a model*. A false idea of pictures was being utilized and then internalized. For pictures to play a role, for us to read off from a picture what it depicts, we need both the general circumstances of our lives and the particular circumstances surrounding the case at issue. That robs the picture of its centrality, and hence its title to being "the understanding."

That is Wittgenstein's first line of attack against the conception of understanding as a definite mental state or process. In §§143-155, concerning the grammar of understanding, Wittgenstein investigates features of how we talk about understanding. He brings in an example of understanding a series. This is meant to be a very sharp example, for we have a natural candidate for the *content* of what is grasped, viz., the principle of the series. Wittgenstein will try to show that this natural candidate will not do the work that the philosophical model requires of it. There is a nice contrast here. One way of attacking various notions of content and the concomitant notions of understanding is to take some ordinary case and show that one cannot really separate that which pertains to the understanding of a word from that which pertains to the knowledge of what as a matter of fact the word applies to — i.e., the distinction between truths of language and truths of fact. So the line of attack on these notions of content and understanding proceeds by way of rejecting such a distinction. There is nothing we have by dint of understanding that can be sharply separated from what we have by dint of factual knowledge.

But Wittgenstein does not do this at all. He takes cases in which it is clear what pertains to understanding *per se*, but he wants to say that even in *these* cases, the model of a definite state or process fails to do justice. This idea of understanding a series, where we have the principle of the series as a natural candidate, is a good example. Indeed, Wittgenstein starts with even the simple case of a finite series of 0 up to 9. Imagine being taught this series. The issue is the possibility of the learner's understanding this series and going on to write it independently. What bridges the gap between what we are supposing as the content of the understanding (i.e. this

surveyable series) and the learner's going on to write it? Many factors operate here. The learner has to know that she is to write them; she has to know that the order is at stake. Wittgenstein asks us to think of the things that can go wrong, and then to think of the circumstances in which we would say various things about whether it had gone wrong or right. Think of cases in which we would say that the learner understood us as asking that the membership of the set $\{0,1,2,\dots,9\}$ be written down, or as asking that she think up a new sequence for those integers entirely. We will see no sharp distinction between the learner's making a random mistake and making a systematic one. Nor will we discover any sharp distinction between the learner's not understanding the series and understanding it wrongly. There are links between these two kinds of contrast, but they are none too tight themselves.

The point, then, is that we pick up on all sorts of things in our talk of understanding: a wealth of surroundings can be at issue. The learner might not understand, but this comes down to the fact that nothing forces her to take the series in just one way. Our capacities to learn, and the circumstances invoked, are not localizable. Success is not vested in one particular thing. Wittgenstein wants to change our way of looking at things.

What we say about the learner's success or failure — whether we say that she got the general idea but is a little foggy on details, or that she understands it but is careless in writing it down — brings in an enormous amount of material about the learner and the circumstances: frequency, whether we see a pattern in her behavior, or whether it makes sense to ascribe a pattern to the learner's thought at all; that will bring in who the learner is and what her situation is like. All these things enter.

We are to see that there are no sharp boundaries to be divined by closer examination. All of that is meant to suggest how differently these notions operate "in the flesh," so to speak, than that which suggests the philosophical model of the "understanding switch" that has two positions: on and off. It is meant to undermine the idea that there is one intrinsic fact of the matter that we could discover in principle. Decisions about whether the pupil understands may arise from extraordinarily disparate things about the learner and the situation.

Now let's pass from the simple model of the finite series to the infinite sequence. When does the learner understand the sequence of the natural numbers? How much

does the learner need to produce, and with what requisite accuracy? All those additional questions arise. Wittgenstein wants us to see the intricacy, non-uniformity, and variegation in our ascribing understanding.

His admonition is to look at the range of judgments that we make about whether someone understands, and the range of considerations that we (might) bring to bear in making those judgments. We see that very disparate things may be involved in judging that the learner is making a mistake, say, rather than that she is expressing an incorrect understanding. Think of all the various categories we might be using in our judgments, and of all the things we might adduce in order to support them: facts about the circumstances, the particular actions of the learner, what reactions the learner has, and features of the learner's history and situation.

But even this list of considerations understates the intricacy of understanding. It can be at issue *when* something — say, a particular performance — counts as a test or not. It certainly can be at issue when a recognized test counts as conclusive. (How many times does the learner need to write it before we can conclusively say that she understands the sequence?) And that is just a simple case of understanding the sequence of digits. What of an "infinite" case — e.g., that of understanding the natural numbers? This case brings in even more. For we are inclined to say that a conclusive exhibition is not possible here. (You cannot recite all of the natural numbers.) How much of the sequence needs to be exhibited? Wittgenstein picks up on this in §146: he asks whether going to the one-hundredth place is sufficient.

That is a picturesque way of putting it, but it is emblematic of a variety of things that we are meant to think about how we judge when a learner has misunderstood. In the end it is no different in kind from the simple case in which we ask how many *repetitions* of the performance are necessary for us to judge that the learner has gotten it. We are meant to see this in the end; and it looks actually at variance with our philosophical ways of thinking about understanding (more on this below).

"How much of the series (or how many times) does the learner have to exhibit for us to say that she understands?" Our answers can, and will, depend on the circumstances and the facts of the case. Wittgenstein is trying to point to the *intricacy, variegation, and spread* of the considerations that we adduce in our judgments of understanding. That is his lesson in the first few sections of this

grammatical investigation.

At §146 Wittgenstein suggests that those very phenomena, with all their indeterminateness, are what lead to the "definite-state-or-process" view — that the latter is a *reaction* to the former. It is a demand for the one mental item that is the *source* of the performances that manifest the understanding. You might say, coming off §145, that the Interlocutor of §146 is really saying this: "Look, Wittgenstein, you are confusing the *grounds* for ascribing understanding with *what* is ascribed." Now, Wittgenstein is quick to point out, the earlier sections on mental pictures show that there is nothing readily available as a model for "the thing ascribed." In the absence of something thus readily available, we need to think about what gives force to the complaint that there *must* be something definite that is ascribed. It is something that the lack of uniformity, and the unsharp nature of our practices, makes us want to have. What pushes us here is that the actual manifestations, and the kinds of things in the surroundings of the manifestations that are at issue in our accepting the manifestations *as* manifestations of understanding, all look like "mere trappings." They are too special, too specific to the case at hand, to be what is at stake when we ascribe understanding. The feeling is that there must be some final item that *grounds* the ascription, and that the ascription is an ascription *of* . Without such a thing, the ascription is arbitrary. — That is the motivation behind the Interlocutor's talk of "the source of the correct use."

The question to be considered is: "What is lacking if we have no such final item?" This is hard to pin down, to be sure. But it can certainly seem that when you look at this panoply of considerations we bring to bear in judgments of understanding, there is nothing finally fixing our ascriptions. At any particular point, we feel that there is some conceivable thing that might still be missing, and that there is always more in the understanding than what we have already seen. Here it is important to be careful about the ways in which it may be accurate to say that there is "always more in the understanding than we are ever in a position to have seen." This brings us back to the question of how much of the sequence of natural numbers the learner needs to recite. For the understanding, we might say, reaches through *all* of it. So that at any point, one who understands the sequence will be able to say what comes next.

That is the push that Wittgenstein is suggesting in §146, although he simply says

there that you do not have a model for this: that the application is still the criterion of understanding, and that there is nothing that would fill the role of the final, internal item that would ground the understanding. There is no item about which there is in principle a fact that makes it the case that a subject understood no matter what the circumstances are.

We are trying to hit off the idea that the push to the state — of "the definite thing that we ascribe" — comes from the felt need that such an item is the only way to give an ascription of understanding real content. Ascribing understanding is different from expounding the variegated things that we adduce in our ascriptions (or so the temptation goes). Wittgenstein depicts this temptation as joined with a mistaken model arising from considering cases in which there is something decisive. As an example Wittgenstein suggests the occurrence of a formula in understanding a sequence. (He could just as well have referred to the occurrence of the mental picture of a cube.) There are cases in which something decisive occurs. But when we say that this thing is not always decisive, we are inclined to inflate the model to handle all possible circumstances. We want something "just like" the formula occurring — only it is *not* the formula occurring.

Wittgenstein is pointing to this. We look at the unsharp, non-uniform, variegated nature of our practices of ascribing, and we think that that cannot be all that we are ascribing; so we seem driven to talk of something underlying as the source of the manifestations. And it is *that* that we ascribe. And then all of the manifestations become *mere evidence* for the presence of this thing. Then the understanding *itself* is always hidden. We do the best we can, and we judge by this raft of features that count as evidence only. In this, our taking the essential thing to be like the formula occurring, but behind it and having more power, Wittgenstein wants to say that we can see the beginnings of the establishment of a notion of a mental mechanism. There must be some *medium* in which all of this takes place. The particular things that we see and go on in our practices of ascribing understanding are mere bits of evidence for what goes on in this mechanism.

The point is that we possess a model of a mechanism (though it is of course not definite what this is), and one of Wittgenstein's points here is that the model fits poorly when we look at the facts again. (This is a typical move of Wittgenstein's. We elaborated on it at length in the discussion of names and definite descriptions. At

one and the same time, the very features of usage that can be seen to push us in the direction of a philosophical way of looking at things actually show, on a closer look, that the philosophical model fits very poorly.) This is implicit in some of the §§150's. Wittgenstein suggests that self-ascription (asserting "I understand") is problematic on the philosophical model. It becomes enormously mysterious how we ascribe understanding to ourselves. For I do not justify my self-ascription by an introspective examination of any mental items. On the other hand, 'I understand' certainly does not mean 'The formula occurs to me', nor does it mean 'I go on correctly'. I can justify my self-ascription in various ways. But this is not to say that there is some totality of conditions exhausting the meaning of 'I understand'. Wittgenstein's point (even in the §§140's) is that the move to the philosophical model as a reaction to the indeterminateness, variegation, and spread, do not help. It just makes the understanding more mysterious and more hidden than ever. It makes problems with respect to features of the grammar of understanding more pressing.

E.g., it brings in the notion of the duration of our understanding. There are circumstances in which it makes sense to say that there was a period of two hours when I did not understand. But you would really need to cook up a case in which that does make sense. The philosophical model of a definite state or process of a mental mechanism makes it unintelligible why certain circumstances are needed to secure the applicability of temporal talk in that way. We are meant *concretely* to imagine circumstances in which, say, duration questions would make sense. (See note under §151.) Is that consonant with the philosophical picture of understanding? — Well, one could always complicate the philosophical model so that it *becomes* consonant with it. But every move that we make within this model seems to complicate things more and more. That undercuts the attractiveness of the model as a response to the indeterminacy in our practices. Every practice becomes inference, guessing at the hidden thing; the actual considerations licensing the inferences become very complicated.

In short, Wittgenstein is trying to get us to see how little we know when we talk generally about the state of understanding as being the thing ascribed. He means to suggest that the philosophical descriptions start to be *empty*. We call something a "state of mind;" but there are all sorts of problems with connecting that state of mind with actual practice. As a result of looking at the contrast between the model

of the state of mind and our actual practices, we are forced into taking these states as ever more esoteric sorts of things. This is Wittgenstein's suggestion in the §§140's.

Wittgenstein says at §153 that we are forced into taking the mental process to be the hidden thing behind all of these mere phenomena. He asks how we could even try to do that — what content that could possibly have. He suggests that in the end it becomes empty. It is this ignoring of the difficulties that is at issue in §149.

Wittgenstein proposes the idea that we talk of understanding as a disposition. He says that that is just fine in its place; you can depict the move to talk of dispositions as just the move to a certain way of talking. It is a new way of speaking — a synopsis of the phenomena we have been meant to be thinking about. It is *only* a synopsis of all that is going on. A useful comparison is with §184, where Wittgenstein talks of the idea of a tune being present to one in its entirety. What is it like suddenly to know a tune? "Surely it cannot have occurred to me *in its entirety* at that moment!" Wittgenstein wants to talk about what it is for a tune to be present to the mind in its entirety; this has a perfectly good sense in some cases. (See the end of §184.)

Wittgenstein says that "The tune is present to the mind in its entirety" is a perfectly anodyne expression as long as it is synoptic for the phenomena of remembering a tune; but not if it is taken as pointing to a particular process called "the tune being present to the mind in its entirety."

Likewise, it is perfectly fine to speak of understanding as a disposition. The danger is that once the move is made to this way of talking, the grammar will get misconstrued; and we will take this new form of expression 'disposition' as a move *closer* to the facts — as if talk of dispositions unearthed something happening inside. Talk of dispositions is fine as long as it is just another way of summing up the phenomena of understanding. You want to block any question that would come by your then taking it to be some *internal representation* of the understanding. Consider "The tune is present to the mind in its entirety": if you take that just to be defined by "coming to the conviction that you know the tune and being able to reproduce it", then that should not bring up questions about the nature of the internal representation that must be going on. You should not take the phrase as describing an internal mechanism. The case with understanding is entirely parallel.

The synoptic nature of talk of dispositions is shown, Wittgenstein seems to say, by

the lack of two different sorts of criteria. He says at §149, "There are objections to speaking of a state of the mind here, inasmuch as there ought to be two different criteria for such a state: a knowledge of the construction of the apparatus, quite apart from what it does." So in ascribing dispositions, all we have to go on is what they do. If one thinks that talk of dispositions is to amount to anything more, then we need some other way of getting at how the dispositions work. Wittgenstein is not committed to saying that we need knowledge of a thing's inner structure before we can talk of its states. His point is weaker: In the sense that we talk of dispositions as states of a mechanism, we know *nothing* along these lines — no pointers, no idea even of what categories to apply in talking of internal structures. To take talk of dispositions as more than synoptic is illegitimate, since that would involve our having *some* idea of how things look — *some* model of the apparatus. We ought at least to know what "finding out about the structure" would be like. There ought at least to be *foreseeable* criteria of what would count, even if we are not in possession of actual criteria. Everything that Wittgenstein has pointed out in the sections leading up to §149, though, shows how *bad* our situation is here. We lack even a perspicuous overview of all of the *outward* criteria. There is no well-defined totality of conditions, no "checklist" to run through in ascribing understanding. If we have no notion of that, then we surely lack a notion of the sort of *apparatus* that supposedly underlies understanding. In a sense, when we talk of mental states we make it up as we go along.

Our notions of apparatus start developing only given these notions like disposition, which Wittgenstein thinks are rooted in *synoptic* applications. In this way Wittgenstein gives some content to the idea that we are misconstruing the logic of our language. We have an instance of that idea in the present case.

A further element in the considerations here — coming out in the §§150's — is Wittgenstein's trying to undercut the drive for the hidden state, the drive for something that conclusively amounts to a description's truth or falsity. This tack lies in pointing out that the spread that so motivated the idea that something must lie in back is simply pushed someplace else. It is pushed into the relation of the state to what it produces. So we go back to another theme raised in §§139-40: not only do we lack a model of the state of understanding, we also lack a model of this relation of "flowing," according to which the correct usage "flows from" the hidden state. All we have is "the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored

medium." We have no idea what we are saying in taking a definite mental state or process as the source of the manifestations. How it is supposed to serve is completely obscure. We lack a conception of the connection between the state and the actual practice.

This comes about because of the great variety of considerations that go into our making judgments. The question is: How is that there is one state that produces such variegation in what we use as grounds for our ascriptions? In each particular case, you might say, there is some account connecting the understanding itself with how we proceed. Are we saying that in each particular case there is some such particular story? Then we will want to know what role that one state is playing. All that you are really saying is that in each particular case, it is those particular circumstances that justify the ascription of understanding. *The state drops out.*

On the other hand, one might say that there is a full story such that each individual case fits some clause. Then the idea is that in getting from the understanding, there is a complete story such that anything that is operative *anywhere* in any particular case of understanding must be operative *everywhere*. That will lead to the idea that there must be a lot in each case of understanding that goes on *unconsciously*. How could this explain why our practices are *selective* among considerations in different cases? How do we get the notion of correct application in there into the one state? If Wittgenstein pushes to the considerations of indeterminateness and spread hard enough, then it would seem very odd to say that in, say, very straightforward circumstances, our ascriptions of understanding involve anything that might arise in any case. To say that my mental state "includes" everything that goes on in any case, looks like a mere insistence. So we are to see that a philosophical jump gets made.

But then the idea of the "full story" is meant to disappear on us, in which case we have merely the disjunction of each of the individual stories. But that leaves us with all of the variegation and spread again; and our hold of what it is to talk of the uniform state begins to vanish. The idea is that the candidates for the underlying state cannot do the job without reintroducing the very same variegation and non-uniformity to get from it to the correct use, future use, and panoply of considerations in judgment; and that will vitiate the picture of the "hard fact" and evidence for it. But then the dissatisfactions that led to postulating the inner state are still unanswered, for it is still the particular applications that are at issue. That goes

beyond the earlier idea that the model fits poorly. The present idea is that you are simply pushing just the phenomena that you wanted to avoid elsewhere: from the state to the relation between the state and its applications.

To sum up what Wittgenstein is suggesting in these sections: He is urging a "no-process" view of understanding. It is particular circumstances in each case that justify me in my ascriptions — where by "circumstances" we do not mean a circumscribed checklist. What is at stake in any particular ascription depends on the particular case. We could use the phrase "context-dependence" for this: but there is no general notion of "context" as a list of specifiable features. Nor is understanding identified in a particular case with any one thing that may be at stake in that case. You might say: There is no such *thing* as understanding.