Current students - abstracts

Thesis Title: "Word, World and Earth: Agamben, Heidegger and the Politics of Poetic Experience"

Giorgio Agamben describes the contemporary political situation in terms of a "devastating experimentum linguae that all over the planet unhinges and empties traditions and beliefs, ideologies and religions, identities and communities". The argument here is that the rapaciousness of globalised capitalism is such that entire socio-political worlds are undermined and uprooted. The real novelty of this claim lies, however, in the supplementary point that this experience is first and foremost a certain sort of experience with language. Here we are faced with something that is perhaps unprecedented: the claim that globalisation could in essence be a poetic phenomenon. My dissertation focuses on both the grounds for and consequences of this strange yet undeniably striking assertion. Its genealogy can be found in Heidegger, who worked for years to investigate the possibility of undergoing an experience with language that would defy the common sense notion of it as a simple tool for the communication of information. His claim is that language has two different and perhaps incommensurable faces; that words can disappear in communication or refuse such transparency to show themselves more essentially as the material things they are. Here we find Heidegger running up against a crucial phenomenological limit (and thus reason to be wary of any too-neat pragmatist or reductive linguistic idealist reading of him), a point at which the world of Dasein – the structured totality of meaning in which it dwells – is disrupted by an experience of exposure to facticity.

Agamben has developed this metaphysic of the word to the point where it is implicitly foundational for his provocative political philosophy. Agamben's question – and mine – is how the poetic experience of non-predicative, non-representational language could bring us face to face with the possibility of a global community that is itself not founded on any particular predicative content: a community for which the exclusion of any individual or set of individuals would quite literally be a logical impossibility.

Thesis: Untitled

My thesis takes as its point of departure an unconventional reading of Spinoza’s Ethics by Richard Kennington, which has so far received little attention from Spinoza scholars. A pupil of Leo Strauss, Kennington reads Spinoza as an atheistic naturalist who purposefully disguised his true beliefs for prudential and pedagogic reasons. Since open atheism was socially unacceptable in 17th century Europe, he couched his teachings in theological language, both to avoid persecution and to get a favourable hearing for his views. Thus, the Ethics begins by treating of God, a being absolutely infinite, who necessarily exists and upon whom all other things depend. However, Kennington argues, Spinoza intended that discerning readers would come to realise that the surface doctrine of the Ethics cannot be taken at face value. Such readers would, he hoped, already be familiar with his two published works (Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy and the Theologico-Political Treatise), whose statements on philosophic method contrast strikingly with the actual procedure of the Ethics. These readers would also perceive that the Ethics contains numerous internal inconsistencies and incoherencies, logical fallacies, surprising omissions, structural flaws and inappropriate illustrations. Ideally, these readers would eventually recognise a pattern in the anomalies of Spinoza’s presentation. This pattern provides the key to determining what in the Ethics is meant seriously and what is not.

In my thesis I will defend Kennington’s reading and fill certain gaps in it. I will also build upon it by analysing its implications for Spinoza’s theory of knowledge. I will argue that the notorious ‘panpsychism’ of the Ethics is not intended seriously and that Spinoza is in truth a materialist, recognising no ultimate reality other than matter and its laws. While on the surface he accepts a modified version of the Cartesian dichotomy between intellect and imagination, in fact he rejects this dichotomy and, in line with his materialism, holds a radically empiricist view of knowledge. As is widely recognised, much of Spinoza’s thought represents a response to the philosophy of Descartes, for whom God is the guarantor of all knowledge. He openly attacks Descartes numerous times in the Ethics. However, explicit engagement on all crucial points would involve declaring his atheism. Consequently, he chooses instead to use Descartes’ terminology when presenting his theory of knowledge, while indicating his true, anti-Cartesian views in the manner outlined above.

Thesis Title: “Postcolonial Agency: A Theory of Practice”

The process of Reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians remains an unfinished business. Our transition to postcolonial society requires an appropriate philosophy of transformative action, which will neither reinforce nor reinstate the types of power relations that have become institutionalised as a legacy of our colonial history. Indeed, Reconciliation should introduce a discontinuity or a difference into this history, allowing Australians to ‘exit’ from habitually colonial assumptions and practices of relation, along with a corresponding opportunity to reconstruct modes of social existence upon an alternative and ethical, postcolonial political basis.

Modern critical and transformative social theory has been dominated by a tradition of dialectical thought. History represents the gradual unfolding of a rational organization of society; social agency consists in the collective effort to describe and realise this rational end. On this view, progressive transformative action moves society towards an ideal state of perfect and rational consensus, reflected in social organization. The ideal functions as a transcendent, final cause of social action, which draws history inexorably towards completion, and society towards agreement and unity. In this schema, difference has a critical function, since it signifies where and how the social ideal of unity is failing. It describes a certain lack of coherence, which makes it the critical force of transformation; difference compels the process of history by negating the perfection of the present. However, social unity is realised when the contesting or negating difference is able to be assimilated within a greater unity; the dialectic of history progresses by eliminating and assimilating difference.

I draw from an alternative philosophical tradition including Spinoza, Nietzsche and Deleuze, to present an alternative philosophy of transformative action. On this view, progressive history does not realise a given ideal order, which operates as a transcendent final cause. Rather, social organization is the result of a spontaneous, creative and open-ended process of actualisation, in which social forms emerge and transform as an effect of the shifting relations of power that bodies enter into. Social agency consists in the effort to understand and organise one’s relations in ways that actualise preferred forms of collective society. This alternative philosophy supports a critical and constructive agency, which has a creative, positive and ethical relation to difference. These qualities suggest how this philosophy of transformation can usefully inform practical critiques of colonialism and the reconstruction of postcolonial societies. In particular, the notion of agency carried within this tradition of philosophy describes a form of reflexive subjectivity that can be receptive to the kinds of possibilities and ethical responsibilities faced by agents in sustaining multicultural, postcolonial societies.

Thesis Title: “Time and Interpretation”

Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) does not regard the philosophical theme of time as one problem among others but the central problem of philosophy pure and simple. His interpretations of the history of Western philosophy are intended to provide confirmation of the general thesis of his Sein und Zeit (1927) that time is ‘the possible horizon for any understanding of being in general’, which places the concept of time at the centre of ontology. In this history Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) stands out as exceptional, Heidegger argues, for having explicitly seen the relationship between being and time which traditional philosophy had implicitly presupposed.

Thesis Title: “The Interrelated Functions of Justice and Justification in Platonic Dialectic: A Noetic Overview”

I will seek to present a noetic overview of the various accounts of justice in the ‘Republic’. There have been many attempts in the literature to highlight interrelations between these accounts, both through interpreting them in terms of a developing sequence, and by seeing how the early accounts constrain, and are constrained by, later ones. These two interpretations are importantly linked, and I will give a brief outline of each before turning to consider a couple of major problems that they pose for Plato’s treatment of justice. These problems concern whether the early accounts of justice (reflecting the conventional Greek conceptions) are relevant to, and/or are entailed by, the latest account (reflecting the Platonic conception). I will argue that the early accounts are both relevant to, and entailed by, the latest account, and that, in accordance with Plato’s methodology, a just rendering of all the accounts necessitates interpreting them in terms of each other, ‘rubbing them against one another’ like fire-sticks, in the hope causing the spark of justice to flash forth’ (Rep 434e). This method of comparison is necessary for ascending towards a noetic overview of one’s subject, and can be employed in demonstrating how conventional accounts of justice are relevant to, and entailed by, Plato’s account. In developing this thesis, a close interrelation will emerge between the function of justice and the function of justification in Platonic dialectic. In order to give a just(ified) rendering of this dialectic, it will be argued that active comparison is required not only between the various accounts of justice, but between these accounts and the various accounts of justification in the dialogue.

Provisional Title: “The consequences of non-locality to current models of
space-time.”

Quantum theory as it stands is (arguably) a non-local theory, i.e. allows
particles with spacelike separations to influence one another. If the
theory is correct, models of spacetime must be altered to include this
property. The project will be an exploration of these alterations.

Thesis Title: “Psychoanalysis as an Interpretive Science”

My thesis is that psychoanalysis is an interpretive, human science. This science cannot be causal, because the mental is anomalous (Davidson) and inner states need outer criteria (Wittgenstein). From both of these, which support each other, it follows that inner states are not substantive objects; therefore a causal framework is inappropriate. The relationship between mental states and their outer criteria is normative, and therefore psychoanalysis is a normative theory, belonging within the domain of second nature (McDowell). Mental states are derived from the external world of practice, and must therefore be explained in terms of the rules and norms of external practice, both material and linguistic. Therefore, psychoanalysis requires a philosophical framework which is normative, external and based on social practice.

Mental states can be analysed into dispositions and the experiential episodes that express them according to rules. Dispositions are only implicitly mental; they can be expressed both in behavioural episodes, verbal and non-verbal, and in symptoms. Symptoms express rule-governed hypotheses. Irrational episodes are behavioural expressions of inferences from rule-governed hypotheses. They occur according to the rules of grammar operating in perception; in particular, according to the rules governing prototypes, basic-level categories, gestalt perceptions, metonymy and metaphor. The behaviours are irrational because the subjects’ hypotheses are false within the contexts in which they are made. Hypothesis is an essential element in any scientific method. Therefore, there is no good reason to suppose that psychoanalysis is not a science.

The practice of psychoanalysis is the safe testing of hypotheses. Its aim is the increase in objective, rational self-awareness based on increased self-acceptance. Self-awareness is a moral end in itself. (What the patient does with this increased self-awareness, whether they are happier with it or not, is not the concern of psychoanalytic practice.) The method of testing is by interpretation of behaviour, mainly but not only verbal behaviour, within the therapeutic relationship. Therefore, psychoanalysis is an interpretive science.

Title: 'Numerical Identity'

An evaluation of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, including an examination of the extent to which the principle is (i) true; (ii) trivial; (iii) necessary or contingent.

Thesis Title: “Nonhuman animal property rights: reconciling ecological holism and species-blind liberalism”

I outline and defend a theory of property entitlements for free-roaming nonhuman animals. The framework is offered as a pragmatic solution to the debate between communitarians and liberals in environmental ethics. Roughly, the former prioritize ecological “wholes” like ecosystems, whereas the latter consider psychological individuals as ethically prior. Both camps, however, oppose human intervention in natural areas that is destructive of habitat. Thus, a property entitlement, demarcated along territorial behaviour patterns, and administered on the animals’ behalf by a guardian, ought to be acceptable to those who value either wholes or parts. Such a right is a force for promoting ecosystem stability and a constraint against harming animal interests.

Thesis Title: "An Ideal Justification of Punishment"

Legal punishment is frequently regarded as a cornerstone of the legal system yet (surely to its detriment) it is a practice which lacks a firm philosophical foundation. In spite of exercising many extremely capable legal and philosophical minds (particularly during the twentieth century) no generally agreed upon justification of punishment has been found. The nub of the problem has however been acknowledged as the inability of either of the major candidate theories (utilitarianism or retributivism) to provide an account able to address all the relevant parties. Whilst utilitarianism is often regarded as competent to the task of justifying punishment to society in term s of the attainment of some greater good, it seems entirely inadequate when it comes to formulating a justification to the criminal to explain why he has been singled out for punishment. And in the case of retributivism the situation is reversed. To the criminal it can be put that through punishment he is treated in accordance with what has done, but in the matter of justifying punishment to society, the key principle of desert is unable to be properly grounded. Thus the central motivation of this thesis is to attempt to redress this shortcoming in the philosophical literature and to formulate a viable justification of legal punishment.

Ultimately it will be argued that the accounts of both Kant and Hegel offer a way of resolving the dilemma of punishment, and in particular it is their idealist orientation over and above their more widely acknowledged characterization as retributivists which allows them to fulfil this role. In Kant’s case his contribution is derived from a reworked and more sophisticated version of his retributivism than is generally found in the literature. Following Susan Meld Shell’s lead Kant’s construction of justice is explored and found to both enhance and support the traditional justification of punishment he can offer to the criminal, and to furnish an otherwise elusive justification of punishment to society more broadly. A reading of Hegel on punishment is also developed by taking seriously his theory of recognition and aspects of his logic, particularly regarding negation and contradiction. His account then addresses quite neatly and straightforwardly the three audiences for whom a justification of punishment is sought – the criminal, the victim and society itself.

Not only does the thesis address the problem of punishment but it has further implications for Kant and Hegel scholarship as well as philosophy more broadly. One of the key points to come out of this thesis is that Kant and Hegel (if given adequate intellectual consideration) seem potentially able to offer up significant contributions to contemporary problems and issues beyond just the one argued for here regarding punishment. Their work is not merely of historical interest but has real and wide ranging possibilities which provide a rich resource for future research.

Thesis Title: “Power/Resistance: Michel Foucault's Political Ontology”

My thesis is an attempt to thoroughly, philosophically understand Michel Foucault’s concepts of power and resistance, which are taken up by any number of authors, but have never been exposed to rigorous analysis. I attempt to understand the epistemological and ontological bases of Foucault’s development of these concepts, to analyse the concepts themselves as they develop through his corpus, in the light of his biography, and to cash out the consequences of his view for political practice, particularly left-wing activism.

My argument is that Foucault’s ontology is objectivist. His understanding of power is social scientific and systems theoretic, and his understanding of resistance is hence also from the perspective of the social system: resistance is the ‘intransigence’ of people’s unpredictability and thus behaviour in ways which inevitably escape the control of the strategies of the ensemble of power relations. However, since resistance is nothing more than unpredictability, resistance per se constitutes an insufficient basis for the attainment of political goals. While revolutions are possible at the level of power, there is no possibility of abolishing power since it is a necessary feature of social systems, thus these revolutions must occur by radically changing the ensemble of power relations, rather than destroying them. This is not to reduce all change to reform, however, but rather to recognise the need for radical change, but radical change that must occur a the level of power itself. Hence, revolution becomes a matter of intervening at the level of power by forming a counter-power, not by demanding unmitigated liberation.

In addition to my thesis, I have been working on building a Foucauldian account of imperialism, based on Foucault’s accounts of biopower and racism.

Title: “Evidence Based Medicine: Epistemic Limits and Their Consequences”

The aim of this project is to respond to the difficult philosophical questions raised by evidence based medicine (EBM) and the role it plays in therapeutic decision-making. Over the last decade EBM has been put forward, both from within the medical community and externally, as the principle paradigm within which medicine should be practiced. Within EBM, randomised controlled trials are seen to provide the current best evidence. Two questions arise in the context of therapeutic decision-making; the population question: What are the likely aggregate benefits of a particular drug in a given population of patients? And the individual clinical question: What are the likely aggregate benefits of a particular drug in a given individual patient?

Particular focus will be given to how philosophical argument may contribute answering these questions. This will involve responding to questions such as: What is the role of probability in the interpretation of RCTs and the practice of EBM? And, how should different types of evidence be understood in making therapeutic decisions?

Thesis Title: “Leibniz versus the Cartesians”

The philosophy of Leibniz is anti-Cartesian in its fundamentals. But the deficient publications record has seen scholars struggling for centuries to derive a true and consistent picture of its metaphysical underpinnings. Recently many papers have come to light which enable us to fill in many of the blanks and urge on us a reconsideration of all its tenets. In particular, these writings put an altogether unsuspected slant on Leibniz’s ontology. They suggest a reorientation of his philosophy in two directions simultaneously: backward, for the wholly new slant thrown on the nature of his relations to Cartesianism; and forward, insofar as his ideas reveal an unexpected propinquity with many trends in present-day fundamental research. Accordingly this thesis is devoted to a re-interpretation of Leibniz’s philosophy in light of these recent discoveries, with particular emphasis on its relevance in those areas where he elaborated alternatives to the predominantly materialistic theories which are a principal characteristic of the legacy of Cartesianism then and now.

Thesis Title: “On the Relation of Narrative and Scientific Cognition in Aristotle”

A number of contemporary scholars agree that Aristotle outlines a cognitive role for mimetic poetry in the Poetics. That is, he claims that humans by nature learn something by way of mimesis and the evolved forms of mimetic poetry. What it is that Aristotle thinks they learn about, and exactly how they learn, are though uncertain matters. My thesis argues that Aristotle’s outline of poetic, essentially narrative, cognition can be better understood if it is compared with the passages in other works in which he carefully spells out natural scientific cognition and human learning in general. While readings of the Poetics do not usually involve matters of theoretical reason I argue that the language of that work invites this comparison and that there is something useful in considering what is obvious about the Poetics – that it is a book about narrative poetry written by a philosopher and scientist.

Some ideas from my thesis are outlined in my paper 'On the likely form of "autobiographical memory" for Aristotle' in Scan V.2 No.2 September 2005.

Thesis Title: "Long Term Decisions, the Environment, and Ethics"

As a tool in assisting the decision making process, especially complex economic and social decisions, mathematical theories of decision (or simply “decision theory”) have become increasingly important. Formal decision models focus on the outcomes of actions as a basis for assessing which action an agent ought to perform. An essential part of the process is that the decision maker must assign a preference ordering over the possible outcomes. While there are well known issues stemming from the fact that not everybody shares the same preference ordering, environmental decisions, especially those extended in time such as sustainability and conservation, have specific problems of their own. Of particular interest to me is the fact that preferences change over time. Given that many evironmental decisions are substantially extended in time, how do we accomodate for the possible change of preferences in our decision making process? This also raises ethical issues such as whether we have any moral obligation to consider possible future preferences. This in turn raises practical issue such as how to best incorporate future preferences in our decision making.

Thesis Title: “Properties and Morality: An Examination of the Role of Universals in Moral Ontology, and the Development of a Trope Ethic.”

The broad aim of my thesis is to help ensure that developments in metaphysics flow through to those other areas of philosophy that depend on metaphysics. In particular, I wish to look at moral properties and rights, from the perspective of the debate between universals and tropes. My thesis has two specific tasks: 1) To argue that many ethical theories presuppose, or seem committed to presupposing, the existence of universals, and; 2) To see what the consequences would be for ethics if trope theory were true. Central to my study is the relationship between value properties and non-value properties, which I assume to involve the former supervening on the latter. My conclusion will be that while many different ethical theories appear consistent with universals, certain deontological ethical theories are more compatible with trope theory than are consequentialist ones.

Thesis Title: “Loving the Other: Radical Feminist Theory and Heterosexual Practice”

Radical feminist theory is premised on the idea of a universalised hegemony which oppresses the autonomy of all women and subsumes their will to the will of men. It is in this structuralistic and deterministic context that cultural practices such as prostitution, pornography, aesthetics, heterosexual sexual intercourse, romantic love, marriage, the family, and theistic conceptions of ‘God’ are considered morally problematic for each conforms to, reinforces and perpetuates the patriarchal construct. My thesis critiques contemporary radical feminism from a philosophical perspective and in particular discusses the theoretical complexities of universalising the essentialist paradigms and simplistic dichotomies which are its feature. The central radical feminist argument appears to stall at this point against obvious liberal-relativist criticisms, principally under the weight of purging the forced/free, child/adult, first-world/third-world, and consensual sex/rape distinctions. Notwithstanding my critical analysis of radical feminist theory, I hope to argue that radical feminisms general conception of patriarchy is a salient one for it provides a meaningful basis with which to sensibly comprehend misogynistic practices and other forms of tyranny.

In contrast to a rigorously analytical comprehension of radical feminist theory I will introduce a number of discussions from feminist philosophy on love, virtue, sentimentality, desire, passion, emotion and attachment and will discuss the antithetical relationship of these to suffering, death, dogma, reductionism, longing and existential loneliness. I will also introduce an application of decision theory to the ethics of care into the project. Naturally I will draw from radical feminist theorists such as McKinnon, Dworkin and Jeffreys; but also philosophers such as Kant (categorical imperative, deontological moral theory, objectification), Schopenhauer (suffering, love as the agency via which the noumenal enters the phenomenal world), Foucault (sexual fluidity, power and perversion) and Mill (Utilitarianism, On the Subjugation of Women).

Thesis Title: “An Analysis of the World as a Process Ontology”

Heraclitus postulated a constantly changing world, one that is always in flux, while A N Whitehead postulated an ontology of a process of becoming and Graham Nerlich argues convincingly that ‘space is a real concrete thing’. Now, it is generally accepted that at the Planck scale space is a quantum foam, a field of random events. Does the world have an event ontology organised according to an ontological principle into the dynamic pattern of space? If it did have such an ontology, what would be the implications for the laws of nature, time, causation, identity and freewill?

In four steps my thesis analyses and develops a process philosophy of the ontology of the world; first, to analyse it in the light of modern physics; second, to develop grounds for postulating an ontology of the world that is an event ontology organised according to an ontological principle into the dynamic pattern of space;third, to assess the philosophical implications of a world with such an ontology for the laws of nature, time, causation, freewill and identity and, finally, to evaluate the success of such an ontology in the unification of ideas about the world and defend the ontology with regard to its internal coherence.

Thesis Title: “ Teleosemantics and the Stigma of Accidental Minds”

Teleosemantics seeks to illuminate the representational content of thought and language; to illuminate what in the world our thought and language is about. Teleosemantics claims that this content is fixed by the natural selection of thinkers and language users, including by the feedback they receive through the operation of (selected) learning processes.

There is a variety of formulations of teleosemantics (e.g. Millikan, Dretske, Papineau, Neander), which are plagued by both their own specific as well as shared technical objections. Whilst I give these objections some attention, my main interest is in the basis of more general motivations for, and more general challenges to, teleosemantics.

I take the main motivation to be the promise of an account of narrow semantic normativity; an account of what makes a representation of the world in thought or language a true or a false representation. Teleosemantics claims to solve this normativity problem by identifying misrepresentation with malfunctions of cognitive mechanisms which have the selected biological function of representation. I argue that teleosemantics is no better placed to explain semantic normativity than other accounts of content which share a commitment to some sort of realism about representation; a commitment that minds are capable of representing the world in a way which is not completely perspectival or interest relative. (Perhaps teleosemantics need not make this commitment, but in practice at least the two go together.) I argue that teleosemantics’ emphasis on biological function is driven more by its aversion to accidental mental content (see Davidson’s ‘Swampman’) than any unique norm-generating capacity of natural selection.

Which brings me to what I take to be the principal basis of resistance to teleosemantics: a willingness to embrace, sometimes tentatively, the content of an accidental mind like Swampman’s, even though it has no selectional history.

So, amongst representational realists at least, I argue that the main debate over teleosemantics should turn on whether one thinks that certain aspects of the history of use of thought and language are constitutive of its content. I have some things to say about considerations favouring either side of that question (and incidentally about why a mild representational realism might be appealing in the first place).

Title: “Social Organicism, Spirit and Recognition in the Early Hegel (1793-1800)”

The project explores Hegel’s earliest work on the themes of social organicism, Geist, the ethics of recognition in Hegel’s earliest writings, particularly the so-called Early Theological Writings. The project demonstrates: that Hegel’s early text are works in social theory not theology; that prominent English language critics of Hegel’s social organicism have not understood the theory; that Hegel’s social theory mediates liberal individualism and communitarian collectivism; Hegel’s organicism is opposed to state absolutism, authoritarianism and paternalism; Hegel’s organicism is based in a theory of non-dominance; there is continuity between Hegel’s early Hellenic Ideal, the Organic Ideal and Hegel’s concept of Sittlichkeit or Ethical Life; Geist arises out of ‘natural’ bases and is non-metaphysical in these texts; Hegel’s theory of Geist originates in 1793 setting the date of origin for that theory back 4-5 years; Hegel’s theory of Geist is drawn into relation to his theory of fate to show that the historical development of Geist is driven by normativity; that the Fragment on Love does more than give an account of a non-dominating intersubjectivity but is a general model for reconciliation presenting a condensed proto-Phenomenology of Spirit. Aside from the above points the project contributes to studies of the Early Hegel which have not received as much attention as those works written after 1800 but which are very relevant to understanding his later work.

Thesis Title: “The Protestant Appropriation of Natural Law in England: 1593-1705”

Originally christianised in the work of Thomas Aquinas, natural law became a central part of orthodox Roman Catholic theology. When this theological system was rejected by the protestant reformers, it was inevitable that natural law itself would be brought under scrutiny, and its traditional structure and roles challenged.

This research seeks to examine the directions in which protestant thinkers took natural law in post-reformation England. Against the background of an analysis of natural law in Aquinas and the reformer John Calvin, the thesis looks in detail at natural law in the works of Richard Hooker, William Ames, Thomas Hobbes, and Samuel Clarke. Special attention is paid to the following issues:

• pre- and post-lapsarian conceptions of human nature, including proper human ends, and how this informs the structure of natural law theory, and the epistemic availability of natural law;
• theistic voluntarism, especially in relation to moral law, obligation, and reward;
• the theological role of natural law, particularly in relation to protestant soteriology and its implications for the ongoing role of natural law against the charge of antinomianism;
• the role of natural law in state and church government.

As well as identifying a variety of different natural law theories developed by English protestant philosophers and theologians, the findings challenge a number misconceptions surrounding protestant natural law:

• that protestant philosophers and theologians rejected natural law theory;
• that natural law has no positive role in protestant theology;
• that protestant moral theory is voluntaristic;
• that protestant natural law can be identified with what Richard Tuck has labeled 'modern natural law'.

Thesis Title: “Constructive Philosophy: What Philosophy Contributes to the Grand Simulation of Everything”

This work provides an explication of Quine's argument against the analytic-synthetic distinction and a purely natural complete account of rationality. In particular it provides a natural account of the exercise of pure reason and its role in the pursuit of knowledge. As well as intrinsic interest in understanding what it is that philosophers do, this exonerates naturalism from Putnam's (and others) charge that it is self-defeating.

Thesis Title: “The Nature of Time”

Plato writes about Time: “Now the nature of the ideal being was everlasting, but to bestow this attribute in its fullness upon a creature was impossible. Wherefore he resolved to have a moving image of eternity, and when he set in order the heaven, he made this image eternal but moving according to number, while eternity itself rests in unity; and this image we call time.” –Timaeus 37c

I take this to mean that everything in the universe is, on one level or other, a moving image of eternity; a multiplicity set in motion which images the nature of eternity; a dialectical net of pairs of opposites which emerge dynamically from the One and comprise the nature of the universe. For Time moves “according to number”, while “eternity itself rests in unity.”

Time is, in fact, a multiplicity of movements nestled within one another, comprising a complex, whole, dynamic Cosmos: the “moving image of eternity.”

On a metaphysical level, there is the movement of the Forms being instantiated in many particulars, which in turn try to emulate the original Form which they represent.

On an ethical level, there is the dialogue between vision and recollection which is the foundation of knowledge and simultaneously moves towards knowledge, which is virtue itself.

On a physical level, there is the movement and revolution of the stars and heavenly bodies which gives rise to the hours of the day and the seasons.

One could possibly situate a philosophy of physics in this context by considering that the movement of light, itself having a dual nature (particle/wave), gives rise to the existence of living creatures – self-moving organism

Can the conflicting drives and desires of life ever be accommodated, to every relevant person's satisfaction, by a political sphere intent on guaranteeing equal freedom to all? Or will the rigours of life forever condemn us to Thucydides' assessment that, 'the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must'? Can we avoid the vulgar relativism of a contemporary biopolitics that resists the violence of subsumption under universal descriptions, arguing for the unlimited development of all particulars, regardless of values, yet demands the enforcement of universal rights for the sake of justice? Using Arendt's reflections on the political and philosophical tradition of the West, and the momentous political phenomena of totalitarianism and revolution in modernity, as a foil, I shall rethink these political categories in relation to the global political climate that has developed since September 11th. I shall look at Arendt's work in relation to Benjamin and Agamben, and examine how history can be written and read as a tool of philosophical and political critique. Through clarification of Arendt's conceptual understanding of the work of philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, Kant and Heidegger, I hope to reconcile Plato's removal of thinking from the murky pool of human affairs with Arendt's advocacy of thinking in the political sphere. Apart from my basic aim of becoming a sound philosopher who can make incisive and helpful commentary on political matters, I hope to examine the influence upon Arendt of the phenomenological projects of Heidegger and Jaspers, suggesting that another influence must be cited for a fuller account of what Arendt attempted to achieve (namely, Husserl's attempt to unify all western sciences on a common rational ground).

The two papers that comprise this dissertation are connected by an interest in what is at stake in cases where a subject or domain is falsified – by which I mean mischaracterised – by a person. It would not meet my concerns to characterise this as an issue about what is going on when we form false beliefs about a given thing; the concern is rather with judgement as a whole. The thesis is motivated by a conception of human beings as prone to distortion in the way of their representation of a given domain, and I am primarily interested in how we might think of the philosopher in particular as so prone. The first of the papers, “The Function of Truth: On Friction and the First Person”, takes the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, as he is read by so-called resolute interpreters, to foreground this conception of the philosopher; and the second, “Redescribing the Animals”, takes the view of animal life to emerge from John McDowell’s Mind and World to instantiate it. Thus motivated, the two papers are interested in how cases of the sort of falsification at issue bring into relief a distinctive role for truth and for realism, respectively. In the first paper, I take Wittgenstein to provide a context for a distinctively first-personal role for truth, and I consider whether that role can be properly captured by a recent theory of truth; that of the contemporary pragmatist Huw Price. To bring out the first-personal role for truth I consider the relationship between truth and sincerity, and while I find their relation to be stronger than Price allows, I argue that sincerity is insufficiently robust to handle the concerns I take Wittgenstein to be speaking to. That these concerns call for an ethical notion of truth is brought out, finally, by a discussion of a recent biography of Iris Murdoch by A. N. Wilson. The second paper is concerned to make out the right terms in which to criticise McDowell’s view of animal life. This involves some substantial engagement with McDowell on his own terms on both the issue of animal perception and animal sensation, the upshot of which is that McDowell is shown to be committed to a view of animals as radically different from, or alien to, human beings. I diagnose this outcome as a failure of realism, to characterise which I turn to examples from the novelist J. M. Coetzee. To the extent that realism is basic to quietism – the methodology McDowell claims for his project – I argue that McDowell’s project fails on its own terms.

Title “Nietzsche: Amor Fati and the Will to Art”

The central focus of my thesis is to explore Nietzsche’s doctrine of Amor Fati in relation to the will to art (i.e. will to art as a means to love fate). In the Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche contends that existence is justified only as aesthetic phenomenon. Although Nietzsche’s thought is often categorised into three periods (romantic, positivist, mature), this general concern for the problem of (the meaning of) existence can be seen to animate his thought throughout. The solution for the romantic Nietzsche is to justify existence by means of “other-worldly” art, while the later Nietzsche affirms existence by means of “this-worldly” art. It is ultimately the latter “this-worldly,” life affirming or Dionysian art I am concerned with.

My investigation will draw on numerous sources (at this point esp. Plato, Aristotle, J.L. Austin and Wittgenstein). In particular I see a useful affinity between Austin’s notion of “performatives” and Nietzsche’s “will to power.” This would provide a general pragmatic framework within which to explore Nietzsche’s thought. Recently I have also become very interested in Thucydides and his tragic portrayalof power (and the hubris-nemesis dynamic in general), which is relevant to Nietzsche’s tragic conception of life.

Title: “Asymmetries and Saliencies: Essays on the Causal Perspective”

“Asymmetries and Saliencies” is a collection of essays on time and causation concerned primarily with developing an account of how several different parts of what Wilfrid Sellars called the manifest and the scientific images of the world fit together. My focus is on some of the aspects of the manifest image that look threatened, given certain assumptions, from the perspective of the scientific image: the passage of time, the temporal asymmetry of causation, and mental causation. I reject the common assumption that the manifest image must either be reduced to or eliminated in favour of the scientific image, suggesting that we should think of these issues in terms of what form the best explanation of the manifest image should take. This leaves reduction as an option, but forestalls any question of eliminativism – in effect, we take the manifest phenomena as given, do not presuppose that the relevant concepts or phenomenology make any metaphysical claims, and go on to enquire after the best explanation for the phenomena. The essays amount to case studies in possible ways the explanation may go – the unifying theme is that in each case I argue against reductionism and for a view according to which there is a central contribution made by those features of the scientific image responsible for the particular temporal and causal perspective we have onto that image. I begin with the passage of time, which provides an example of the way in which features of the manifest image can fail to be reflected in the scientific image. I argue that this doesn’t entail eliminativism, but simply a rejection of several naïvely metaphysical explanations for this form of our temporal experience. In reply, I argue that the resources required to explain temporal experience need make no use of anything justifiably described as temporal passage. I proceed to argue for an agent-oriented interventionist view of causation, on the grounds that it best explains causal asymmetry; and I conclude by showing that this view of causation dissolves the traditional problems of mental causation – thereby showing that some prima facie worries about how the scientific and manifest image fit together can turn out to be grounded in misconceptions of the relevant concepts. The end result is a conception of our place in the world that requires no additional resources than those provided by the scientific image, while doing no violence to the manifest image.

Centre for Time

I have assembled some useful resources for philosophy here.

PhD Candidate
Thesis Topic: Philosophy & Responsibility
Supervisor: Dr. Bruin Christensen

This thesis takes the concept of responsibility as the vantage point from which to examine major reorientations that have occurred in post-Heideggerian philosophy, particularly in the area of ethics. Firstly, I argue that a significant rethinking of responsibility has taken place in the work of a number of philosophers which has affected a major shift in the terrain of moral philosophy; a shift that has been acknowledged and responded to by even more philosophers, whether positively or negatively. As such, the first task of this thesis is to elucidate and analyse this recasting of responsibility and to clearly articulate its relation to previous traditional notions of responsibility. Such a task requires careful investigation into the dynamics of a complex genealogy in which the philosophical, juridical, ethical, political and religious infiltrate one another. In this task I take my lead from the later writings of Derrida and in particular from his book ‘The Gift of Death’ where he examines most explicitly the meaning of ‘European responsibility’: the historicity of this concept, its secrets, limits, and paradoxes. Derrida’s work here engages in conversation with a number of thinkers; most significantly with Patôcka, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, and Levinas.

In brief, it will be argued that the crucial move being made in this translation of the concept of responsibility consists in rethinking it around the notion of ‘response’, such that the question of responsibility becomes a much broader question of responding and being responsive to the other. At the heart of this inquiry then is the question of how to understand the concept of responsibility and what is at stake in the ways we conceptualise it. Must we indeed philosophically examine what is involved in responding in order to think responsibility?

Determining then the scope and implications of this ‘rethinking of responsibility’ constitutes the second major task of this thesis. Does the renewing of this concept indeed give rise to a new kind of ethics; to a turn or bent concerned with ethical responsiveness? And to what extent is such a rethinking able to challenge and transform philosophy, as slogans like ‘ethics as first philosophy’ seem to suggest? I hope to demonstrate the wide-reaching philosophical implications of this increasingly central concept and furthermore to show that the significance and potential of this rethinking are by no means limited to so-called continental philosophy. As such, I will also be examining the work of Stanley Cavell and his 'moral perfectionism' for which responsibility "remains a task of responsiveness".